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Abstract 
Several reasons favour increased ‘temporary’ intra-EU labour mobility through posting of workers 
rather than a more ‘permanent’ kind of intra-EU labour mobility through migration of EU-workers 
and self-employed persons, as a prerequisite for an optimum currency area or as a stabilisation tool 
to support adjustment to asymmetric shocks. Moreover, other criteria to realise an optimum currency 
area and to stabilise asymmetric shocks, in particular through fiscal transfers and wage flexibility, 
could be fulfilled by the posting of workers as well. This posting mechanism, which involves workers 
being temporarily employed in a Member State other than their Member State of origin but still being 
taxed in their Member State of origin, is therefore a useful stabilisation tool in case the Member State 
of origin is confronted with an asymmetric shock. The impact of the stabilisation effect of posting 
workers will be determined by several aspects: the number of posted workers, the wage earned in the 
Member State of temporary employment and finally the period of posting. This stabilisation effect 
was calculated for Greece. If some 10% of the current unemployed population living in Greece would 
be posted for a period of 6 months or longer, yearly approximately € 1 billion labour tax revenues 
would be collected by Greece, which is equal to roughly 4% of their total labour tax revenues. We 
recommend on this basis that Greece could encourage the use of posting of workers as potential 
stabilisation tool. 
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Introduction1 
It is acknowledged that “an EMU-level stabilisation tool to support adjustment to asymmetric shocks, facilitating 
strong economic integration and convergence and avoiding the setting up of long-term transfer flows, could become a 
component for a genuine EMU” (EC, 2012a, p. 31). According to the European Council (2012), the design 
of this ‘insurance’ mechanism, which would be set up within a partial/full ‘fiscal union’, could follow 
a macroeconomic or a microeconomic approach (see also Juncker et al., 2015). De Grauwe (2014) 
considers this mechanism to be crucial for the survival of the EMU but emphasises at the same time 
also the limitations of it because of the arising moral hazard risk and the risk of permanent transfer 
flows. The microeconomic approach refers in particular to the implementation of a European 
unemployment benefit scheme. In recent years, scholars have become increasingly interested in this 
idea (see, for instance, Beblavy, Marconi and Maselli, 2015; Dullien, 2014; Claeys et al., 2014) as is 
the European Commission (2013b).2 Also Vandenbroucke (2014) links this ‘insurance’ mechanism 
to social security systems by arguing for the development of a European Social Union (ESU) (see 
also Vandenbroucke and Vanhercke, 2014). The strong focus on a single stabilising mechanism, 
namely the design of a ‘fiscal or even a social union’, might lead to a blindness for other more obvious 
and perhaps also more realistic options. 
 
Arpaia et al. (2014) make a clear distinction between ‘persistent’ asymmetric shocks and ‘temporary’ 
shocks, the latter of which can be addressed by national stabilisers and safety nets. In that sense, 
security schemes at national level could be considered as the most important stabilisation tool during 
the financial and economic crisis (Pacolet and De Wispelaere, 2015; EC, 2014d). Moreover, the 
applied national fiscal policy and the introduction of a so-called ‘tax shift’ could act as a potential 
stabilising mechanism in case of a ‘temporary’ asymmetric shock (Prammer, 2011).  
 
Mundell (1961) considered factor mobility as the adjustment mechanism to solve more ‘persistent’ 
asymmetric shocks since labour mobility3 should restore ‘full’ employment by decreasing the labour 
force to the jobs available in regions hit by a negative asymmetric shock. Also Krugman (2012) 
emphasised more recently the importance of labour mobility in his paper ‘Revenge of the Optimum 
Currency Area’. Most scholars, however, tend to use a too narrow definition of labour mobility as 
potential stabilisation tool within a currency area. This might also be one of the reasons why labour 
mobility has been criticised as potential adjustment mechanism for Member States confronted with 
an asymmetric shock within the EMU (see, for instance, Eichengreen, 1991 and Puhani, 1999). On 
the contrary, not only labour migration but also other types of labour mobility should be taken into 
consideration. 
 
Within the EMU, to be considered as a currency area, the free movement of goods, persons, services 
and capital is ensured by the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union (TFEU). Intra-EU 
mobility should therefore be considered as the result of the free movement of workers (Art. 45 of 
the TFEU), the freedom of establishment (Art. 49 of the TFEU) and the provision of services (Art. 
57 of the TFEU). The migration of persons of working age resulting in a ‘permanent’ (i.e. more 
durable) stay in the new Member State of residence (as worker or as self-employed person) is only 
one type of intra-EU mobility.4 Other types are cross-border commuting and the ‘temporary’ stay 
 
1  The authors would like to thank Prof Dr Yves Jorens, Sarah Van den Broucke and Dr Filip Van Overmeiren for their very useful comments. 
2  In 2014, the Commission has launched a call for tender in order to assess the feasibility and the value added of introducing a European 
unemployment benefit scheme (VT/2014/045). 
3  Borjas (2010, p. 317) defines labour mobility as “the mechanism that labour markets use to improve the allocation of workers to firms”. 
This includes mobility within the national labour market but also mobility across national labour markets.  
4  Intra-EU migrants may not necessarily move permanently but only for a temporary period to another EU Member State (i.e. ‘return 
migration’). 
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through posting. Posting could be defined as an activity of an employee for his or her employer which 
is temporarily exercised outside the Member State where the employer is established (this term is not 
defined in taxation law).5 Posting encompass both the freedom to provide cross-border services and 
the free movement of workers. The term ‘posted worker’ applied in the paper includes both posted 
workers and posted self-employed persons. 
 
This paper will emphasise the added value of posting of workers as stabilisation mechanism within 
the Eurozone but also within the EU. Several reasons favour increased ‘temporary’ intra-EU labour 
mobility through the posting of workers over a more ‘permanent’ intra-EU labour mobility through 
the migration of EU-workers and self-employed persons.6 Moreover, other criteria in order to realise 
an optimum currency area and to stabilise asymmetric shocks, in particular through fiscal transfers 
and wage flexibility, could possibly be fulfilled by the posting of workers.  
Optimal currency area theory and the EMU 
An important limitation of regions [Member States in the event of the EMU] with a common 
currency and confronted with an asymmetric shock7 is their inability to depreciate exchange rates in 
order to stimulate demand for export. The theory of the optimum currency area (OCA), introduced 
by Mundell (1961)8 and further complemented by McKinnon (1963) and Kenen (1969), defined some 
criteria in order to reach an optimal9 geographical area for a single currency, whose exchange rates 
are fixed. Fulfilling these criteria should reduce the need for nominal exchange rate adjustments by 
lessening the impact of asymmetric shocks (Mongelli, 2008). Most cited OCA criteria are: price and 
wage flexibility, factor mobility including labour mobility, financial market integration, the degree of 
economic openness, the diversification in production and consumption, similarities of inflation rates, 
fiscal integration and finally political integration (Mongelli, 2002; 2008). Jager and Hafner (2013) 
divide these criteria into two groups, a first group of ‘preventive’ criteria which should reduce the 
exposure of Member States to asymmetric shocks and a second group of ‘stabilising’ criteria which 
facilitate the adjustment to asymmetric shocks. This paper will focus in particular on this latter group. 
Possible ‘stabilising’ criteria within the alternative adjustment process are: labour mobility, price and 
wage flexibility and fiscal integration (Ibid.; Arestis and Sawyer, 2013; European Council, 2012). 
 
During the development of the EMU but also afterwards it was frequently discussed if this monetary 
union could fulfil the conditions of an optimum currency area. Despite the absence of such a thing 
as an OCA test,10 some scholars concluded that the EMU did not fulfil many OCA criteria (see, for 
 
5  Art. 2 of Directive 96/71/EC defines a posted worker as “A worker who, for a limited period, carries out his work in the territory of a 
Member State other than the State in which he normally works”. Art. 12 (1) of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 defines a posted worker 
as “A person who pursues an activity as an employed person in a Member State on behalf of an employer which normally carries 
out its activities there and who is posted by that employer to another Member State to perform work on that employer's behalf …, 
provided that the anticipated duration of such work does not exceed twenty-four months and that he is not sent to replace another 
person.” Article 12 (2) of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 defines a posted self-employed person as “A person who normally pursues an 
activity as a self-employed person in a Member State who goes to pursue a similar activity in another Member State …, provided that 
the anticipated duration of such activity does not exceed twenty-four months.” 
6  Making a distinction between ‘temporary’ and ‘permanent’ labour mobility is only one possible method to analyse the different types 
of labour mobility. Green et al. (2009) report mobility on the basis of duration and the frequency of movement. However, the 
determination of ‘long-term’ and ‘short-term’ mobility is a challenging issue. For instance, in case of posting, the temporary 
employment is limited to a maximum period of 24 months under social security coordination law and 183 days under taxation lax. 
The literature reported by Green et al. (2009) suggests a period of at least a year in case the term ‘long-term’ would be used. 
7  “An economic shock is considered to be asymmetric if only one part of the currency area is hit by the shock while the other part is 
spared or if member countries differ widely in terms of the shock’s impact on their economies” (Jager and Hafner, 2013, p. 315). 
8  For a more detailed review, see for instance, Horvath, 2003. 
9  The interpretation of the term ‘optimal’ is divers (see, for instance, Horvath, 2003). Mongelli (2008, p. 2) states that “optimality is defined 
in terms of various OCA properties.”  
10  It is remarkable that the theory of the optimum currency area was largely ignored during the development process of the EMU. The 
EC (1990, p. 31) in its report ‘One Market, One Money’ even states “there is no ready-to-use theory for assessing the costs and benefits 
of EMU. Despite its early insights, the 'theory of optimum currency areas' provides a too narrow and somewhat outdated framework 
of analysis.” 
  
5 
instance, Eichengreen, 1991). Frankel and Rose (1997) concluded, however, that even after the 
implementation of the EMU the OCA criteria could be reached ex-post as a result of the endogenous 
effects (see also De Grauwe and Mongelli, 2005). Nonetheless, Jager and Hafner (2013, p. 322) 
concluded more recently that “the lack of adjustment tools such as labour mobility or a transfer payment system 
makes it very costly for the EMU to recover from the current crisis.” 
 
The implementation of a so-called ‘fiscal union’ or ‘fiscal federalism’ (Oates, 1972; 2005)11 as a result 
of fiscal integration is the most frequently discussed criteria of the OCA-theory. The ‘MacDougall 
Report’, published in 1977, introduced already the idea of a counter-cyclical fiscal stabiliser at 
European level in order to tackle regional asymmetric shocks. Some of the main features of the 
central government, as part of a fiscal federalism, are the stabilisation and income redistribution 
mechanisms between better and worse performing Member States (Oates, 1999; Abraham, 1996). 
However, this idea to complement an automatic fiscal stabiliser to the EMU has also potential risks. 
Firstly, it might result in a so-called ‘transfer union’ through permanent transfers instead of a ‘fiscal’ 
union. Secondly, there is the risk of moral hazard. Also, the discussion on the development of a 
stabilisation function within the EMU in terms of financing and key features of the mechanism is still 
on-going (Iara, 2015; Clemens et al., 2012; Darvas, 2010; Bordo, et al., 2013; Allard, 2013).  
 
The fact that the EMU is still missing a fiscal stabilisation function is perhaps somewhat unexpected 
since solidarity can be considered as an essential element in the well-functioning of it. As Abraham 
(1996, p. 100) points out “when a state faces an adverse economic shock or suffers from structural adjustment 
problems, it has the right to expect support from other Member States in the federation because it cannot unilaterally 
devalue its exchange rate”. Although, as Clemens et al. (2012, p. 10) conclude “the Eurozone is not doomed 
without a fiscal union” (see also Feld and Osterloh, 2013). In that sense, the financial assistance of the 
European Stability Mechanism (ESM) and the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) alongside 
the intervention of the ECB and the funding of the IMF have been essential in order to preserve the 
financial stability of the EU. To what extent also intra-EU mobility, and in particular posting of 
workers, can act as a financial stabiliser, will be discussed below. 
The ‘limited’ extent of labour mobility in Europe 
If a Member State is hit by a negative shock, workers could migrate to another Member State within 
the same monetary union to keep the unemployment level in the affected Member State low and to 
pursue ‘full employment’ (Krugman, 2012). Many scholars consider labour mobility as very low in 
the EMU, especially compared to the US (Eichengreen, 2014). As a result, the EMU as potential 
optimum currency area has been criticised since it does not fulfil (sufficiently) the requirement of 
interregional labour mobility (Puhani, 1999; Eichengreen, 1991). Yet, is a low level of intra-EU labour 
mobility per se avoidable? If the EU-integration process brings forth rising incomes of new EU-
Member States and an upward convergence/cohesion between Member States, intra-EU labour 
mobility could consequently decrease (Pelkmans, 2006; Bonin et al., 2008). Furthermore, the appraisal 
of the volume of a labour mobility (as too low or high enough) would be more balanced if all types 
of intra-EU labour mobility are taken into account.  
 
Intra-EU labour mobility has in fact different faces (Table 1): ‘permanent’ stay in another EU Member 
by migration, cross-border commuting and ‘temporary’ stay through posting of workers. The first 
group involves EU migrants of working age (15 to 64 years old) who moved to an EU Member State 
other than their EU Member State of birth or citizenship. In 2013, the ‘stock’ of citizens of working 
age (15 to 64 years) from an EU-28 Member State/EFTA country who resided in another EU-28 
 
11  There is a rich literature on the concept of ‘fiscal federalism’ which will not be discussed within the context of this paper (see, for 
instance, Oates, 1999).  
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Member State was around 3.1% of the total population of working age (Cannetta et al., 2014). 
Approximately 7 million EU citizens worked and lived in an EU Member State other than their own 
(equal to 3.3% of total employment in the EU) (European Commission, 2014). Figures on the annual 
inflows are also very relevant. In 2012, approximately 1.8 million EU/EFTA citizens of working age 
migrated to another EU-28 Member State or EFTA country of which some 700 thousand EU-
28/EFTA citizens returned to their Member State of citizenship. In addition, in 2013 roughly 1.3 
million EU citizens were employed in an EU Member State other than their EU Member State of 
residence (= ‘cross-border workers’), representing roughly 0.4 to 0.6% of total employment in the 
EU. Some 65% or 814 thousand cross-border workers were employed in a neighbouring Member 
State (= ‘frontier worker’)12. Finally, in 2013 some 1.34 million ‘Portable Documents A1’13 were 
issued to posted workers residing in an EU-28 Member State/EFTA country (Pacolet and De 
Wispelaere, 2014).14 When counting in all these different types of labour mobility, approximately 
4.5% of EU employment could be linked to intra-EU labour mobility. 
 
Intra-EU mobility has experienced an upward evolution during the last decade.15 Especially the EU 
enlargements of 2004 and 2007 have influenced intra-EU labour mobility (OECD, 2012; Jauer et al., 
2014), even despite the applied transitional arrangements16 to restrict inflow of workers from new 
Member States during several years. As a side effect, these transitional arrangements have caused a 
higher number of (bogus) self-employed persons (Kahanec, 2012). At the same time, the temporary 
restrictions on movement of workers from new Member States are probably also a reason for the 
substantial rise of the number of posted workers. Both phenomena can be conceptualised as the 
‘front door/back door principle’ (Van Overmeiren, 2008).17 The number of PDs A1/E101 forms 
issued to posted workers increased from some 1.0 million at the start of the transitional arrangements 
to 1.34 million in 2013 (Pacolet and De Wispelaere, 2014; Ismeri, 2012).  Despite the increase by a 
third, posting represents still a modest impact on the population of working age. Nonetheless, it has 
become an important annual flow of intra-EU mobility. 
 
12  This definition of a frontier worker differs from the definition used in Regulation (EC) No. 883/2004. 
13  The Portable Document A1 is a formal statement on the applicable social security legislation and proves that the posted worker pays 
social security contributions in another Member State. The number of PDs A1 issued according to Article 12 of Regulation (EC) No. 
883/2004 is, however, not necessarily equal to the number of persons involved (cf. infra). 
14  In 2013, a total of 1.7 million PDs A1 were issued by the reporting Member States.  Approximately 1.3 million PDs A1 were related to 
postings to one specific Member State. The remainder PDs A1 were applicable to persons active in 2 or more Member States and to 
common agreements. 
15  Still, even despite the increase of intra-EU mobility the stock of TCN immigrants in 2013 is still higher in the EU (EC, 2014b; 2014d; 
Cannetta et al., 2014). 
16  For a transitional period of up to 7 years (‘2+3+2’ formula) after Member States joined the EU, restrictions may apply on the free 
movement of workers from these Member States. The policy regarding the applied transitional period highly differs across ‘receiving’ 
EU Member States. There are also differences in applicable policy depending on the date new Member States have joined the EU 
(2004, 2007 or 2013) (OECD, 2012; Minderhoud, 2009).    
17  By introducing transitional arrangements one could expect a low level of labour mobility from the ‘new’ to the ‘old’ Member States. 
Nevertheless, on the basis of free movement to provide services and the freedom of establishment posted workers and self-employed 
persons could enter the ‘old’ Member States despite the restrictions on the free movement of workers. This could imply a limited 
number of migrant and cross-border workers entering the labour market of the ‘old’ Member States during the transitional period but 
a high number of posted workers and self-employed entering these Member States. 
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Table 1 Types of intra-EU labour mobility, 2012-2013 
Type Flows/Stocks Number % Year 
Total stock EU/EFTA migrants 
of working age* 
Stocks  3.1% of total EU-28 population 
of working age 
2013 
Flow of EU/EFTA migrants of 
working age* 
Flows 1.8 million 0.5% of total EU-28/EFTA 
population of working age 
2012 
Of which ‘return migration’ ** Flows 714,000 0.2% of total EU-28/EFTA 
population of working age 
2012 
EU migrants working and living in 
another MS other  
Stocks 7 million 3.3% of total EU employment 2013 
Cross-border workers  
in EU-28 
Stocks 1.3 million 0.6% of total EU employment 2013 
Of which ‘frontier workers’*** Stocks 814,000  2013 
Posted workers in EU28/EFTA 
(number of PDs A1)**** 
Flows 1.34 million 
***** 
± 0.2 to 0.6% of total EU/EFTA 
employment****** 
2013 
* By citizenship of the migrant. 
** We cannot know if someone has ever previously lived in the country of citizenship. 
***  Cross-border workers employed in a neighbouring Member State 
**** The number of PDs A1 issued is not necessarily equal to the number of posted workers involved.  
***** In 2013, a total of 1.7 million PDs A1 were issued by the reporting Member States (including posting of workers, active in 2 or 
more coutnries and bilateral agreements).   
****** The real impact will be much lower in case figures are corrected by the number of ‘unique’ posted workers or the number of posted 
workers in full-time equivalents. 
Source Based on LFS; Eurostat data on migration, Cannetta et al., 2014; Pacolet and De Wispelaere, 2014 
 
A large amount of literature exists on the determinants that are likely to affect (labour) mobility (i.e. 
migration). A distinction could, among others, be made between push and pull factors of mobility or 
between long-run and short/medium-run determinants (Pelkmans, 2006). The mobility decision will 
be determined by different socio-economic (e.g. income, unemployment rate, cost of living), 
demographic (e.g. age, education, skills, household composition) and socio-cultural (e.g. network, 
language) aspects (Bonin et al., 2008; Borjas, 2010; Kahanec et al., 2010; Zimmerman, 2009, Beyer 
and Smets, 2015). However, also the cost of moving, not only in terms of a monetary cost but also 
as psychological cost, should be taken into consideration (Zaiceva and Zimmerman, 2008; Bonin et 
al., 2008). Since the probability of labour mobility will be determined by both cost and benefit related 
determinants, Bonin et al. (2008) recommend to enlarge the mobility benefits and to reduce the 
mobility costs. Also in case of the posting of workers push and pull factors could be defined, which 
are not necessarily similar to these in case of migration. 
 
Especially the main causes for the quite limited extent of intra-EU mobility (i.e. migration) should be 
defined in order to assess the limitations of this OCA-criterium. Differences in language and culture 
are considered as one of the key mobility hurdles (Bonin et al., 2008; Zimmerman, 2009). But also 
the risk of not finding a job should be considered as an important obstacle (Bonin et al., 2008).18  
Legal framework 
A short description will be given of the most important provisions in social security coordination and 
taxation law affecting this type of labour mobility (see also Spiegel et al., 2014).  
 
 
18 Other barriers defined by Zimmerman (2009, p. 11) are: “The increase in home ownership; limited transferability of social security 
systems; too little recognition of formal qualifications; a lack of innovation in Europe; a fall in available jobs due to low economic jobs; 
the ageing of the working population, and an absence of transparency of European online employment exchanges”. 
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The social security systems of the countries of the European Union, Liechtenstein, Norway, Iceland 
and Switzerland are coordinated by Basic Regulation (EC) No 883/200419 and Implementing 
Regulation (EC) No 987/200920. At EU level there are no coordinating tax rules determining which 
Member State will tax income during the posting period. However, this may be set out in national 
laws or bilateral tax agreements. The ‘double taxation conventions’ agreed between EU Member 
States are mainly inspired on the OECD Model Convention on Income and on Capital (Spiegel et 
al., 2014). Both types of law should avoid double social security contributions and taxation. Both 
types of law also cover more countries than only the Eurozone. 
 
‘Posting’ under Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 is defined as any activity of an employee for his or her 
employer which is only temporarily exercised outside the Member State where the employer is 
established. This term is, however, not described in the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income 
and on Capital.  
 
Social security coordination as well as income taxation law exempt the posted worker to pay social 
security contributions and personal income taxes in the Member State of temporary employment. 
However, this exemption is temporary and differs between social security coordination and income 
taxation law. Social security contributions21 could be paid in the Member State of origin for a 
maximum period of 24 months, and personal income taxes for a period of less than 183 days within 
a period of 12 months that starts or ends in the fiscal year (Figure 1).22 Moreover, a number of legal 
conditions have to be fulfilled in order to be exempt from the payment of labour taxes in the Member 
State of temporary employment. These conditions and the potential negative impact of it on posting 
of workers as adjustment mechanism, will be discussed in another section of this paper. 
Figure 1 Posting in social security coordination and taxation law, competence to levy taxes 
Posting period Tax Social security 
Less than 183 days MS of origin MS of origin 
Between 183 days and 24 months MS of employment MS of origin 
Longer than 24 months MS of employment MS of employment 
Source Own figure 
Typology of posting of workers 
In 2013, approximately 1.34 million PDs A1 were issued to posted workers temporary employed in 
a Member State other than their Member State of origin (of which approximately 670 thousand issued 
within the EMU) (Pacolet and De Wispelaere, 2014).23 However, caution should be made for 
misinterpretation of this number, as the number of PDs A1 does not refer to ‘unique’ persons. A 
worker could be posted multiple times during the same year, which implies several PDs A1 being 
issued to the same posted person. However, the period of posting could also be longer than one year. 
In absolute terms, the three main sending Member States were Poland (262,714 PDs A1 issued), 
Germany (227,008 PDs A1 issued) and France (123,580 PDs A1 issued) and the three main receiving 
Member States were Germany (373,666 PDs A1 received), France (182,219 PDs A1 received) and 
 
19  Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the coordination of social security 
systems. 
20  Regulation (EC) No 987/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 2009 laying down the procedure for 
implementing Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 on the coordination of social security systems. 
21  Extendable to 5 years (Art 16 of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004). 
22  Art. 12 of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the coordination of social 
security systems. Art. 15 (2) of the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital. 
23  There is still uncertainty to what extent the number of PDs A1 issued by Member States is a precise measure of the actual number of 
postings taking place. For example, in 2012 Belgium received a total of about 373,000 LIMOSA registrations, whereas only 125,000 PDs 
A1 were delivered for persons sent to Belgium (source: National Social Security Office - NSSO). 
  
9 
Belgium (134,340 PDs A1 received). Roughly 56% of all PDs A1 were issued to posted workers 
originating from EU-15 Member States and 86% of the PDs A1 were issued to posted workers who 
were temporarily employed within the EU-15.24 
 
On average an equivalent of 0.6% of the total employed population was posted to another Member 
State. However, when using the number of ‘unique’ posted workers25 this ratio would reduce to only 
0.4% of the employed population. Taking also the posting period into account (the duration of the 
posting period was on average 119 days in 2012 and 100 days in 2013)26, roughly 0.2% of the 
employment in full-time equivalents could be related to the posting of workers. In relative terms, 
Luxembourg and Slovenia were the main sending Member States and Luxembourg, Belgium and 
Austria were the three main receiving Member States. 
In 2013, on average 43.9% of the PDs A1 were issued to posted workers employed in the 
construction sector (Pacolet and De Wispelaere, 2014). Furthermore, 31.8% of the forms were issued 
for activities in the service sector and 22.7% for other industrial activities (excluding the construction 
sector). The distribution of the economic activity varies markedly among the sending EU-15 
(especially employed in the service sector) and EU-13 Member States (especially employed in the 
construction sector). These two types of posting, low-medium skilled workers posted from low 
labour cost to high labour cost Member States, mainly in labour-intensive sectors, on the one hand, 
and medium-high skilled workers posted in qualified occupations, on the other hand was also 
described in previous research (Ismeri, 2012). 
 
The impact of posting on sending and receiving Member States could be related to the evolution of 
the main drivers of posting. Previous research defined the unemployment rate – from a sending 
perspective – and labour costs – from a receiving perspective – as the main explanatory variables of 
the extent of posting (Ismeri, 2012). But also geographical proximity (e.g. 52.3% of the persons with 
a PD A1 were sent to a neighbouring Member State) and labour shortages are important drivers 
(Ismeri, 2012; Idea Consult and Ecorys, 2011; Pacolet and De Wispelaere, 2014; EC, 2014d). 
Nonetheless, the tax advantage that ‘foreign’ services providers may enjoy, could in many cases be 
considered as an additional important push factor (De Wispelaere and Pacolet, 2015). Similar to 
migration, language and culture are considered as the main barriers regarding posting, in addition to 
the administrative burden service providers may face (Idea Consult and Ecorys, 2011). These barriers 
are probably the main causes for the quite limited extent of workers being posted. Consequently, they 
are an important limitation to guarantee a sufficient impact of posting as stabilising mechanism. 
Beneficial components of ‘temporary’ labour mobility as adjustment 
mechanism through posting of workers compared to ‘permanent’ labour 
mobility through migration 
The main goal of labour mobility as adjustment mechanism is to keep the unemployment level in the 
affected Member State low. This could be realised not only through labour migration but also through 
the posting of workers to another Member State of employment. This section will focus on the 
advantages and disadvantages of the posting of workers compared to labour migration as adjustment 
mechanism. Then again, in the end both components will be important given that a broad 
 
24 We use the term ‘EU-15’ to refer to the ‘old’ EU Member States (Belgium, Greece, Luxembourg, Denmark, Spain, Netherlands, 
Germany, France, Portugal, Ireland, Italy, United Kingdom, Austria, Finland and Sweden);‘EU-13’ to refer to the ‘new’ Member States 
(Croatia, Romania, Bulgaria, Poland, Czech Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia, Estonia, Slovakia, Hungary, Cyprus and Malta). 
25  ‘Unique’ implies that posted workers who received more than one PD A1 certificate during the reference period are only counted 
once. 
26  Some caution is required when drawing conclusions since only 8 Member States reported figures on the average duration of the 
posting period. 
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interpretation of the term ‘labour mobility’ could facilitate also a broader range of adjustment 
mechanisms. Moreover, the distinction between both is not strict, since intra-EU migrants may not 
necessarily move permanently but only for a temporary period to another EU Member State (i.e. 
‘return migration’) (Minderhoud, 2009). In 2012, some 700 thousand EU-28/EFTA citizens returned 
to their Member State of citizenship (Table 1). This was especially observed for ‘new’ Member States 
as Romania, Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia (EC, 2014b).  
 
Posting of workers and the negative connotation of this phenomenon, as it would undermine jobs 
for local employees (‘job displacement’) and the competitiveness of local employers, have become a 
hot issue in public and political debate (see, for instance, Jorens, 2009; Maslauskaité, 2014; Idea 
Consult and Ecorys, 2012; Bernaciak, 2014). Perhaps (too) little attention has been paid to other, 
more positive aspects of posting. The ability of posting to increase employment, to decrease 
unemployment, to increase household incomes and labour tax revenues in the Member State of origin 
are important features to stabilise asymmetric shocks (see Figure 2) but also to create convergence 
between ‘new’ and ‘old’ Member States (De Wispelaere and Pacolet, 2015). 
 
Maslauskaité (2014, p. 20) already stressed the importance of posting of workers in order to keep the 
unemployment level low: “such short-term migration of labour might help shield cyclical divergences on sectorial or 
national levels. Companies may thus keep their experienced workers without having to go through firing-and-hiring 
procedures depending on economic cycle of one Member State whereas workers get to keep their jobs, albeit temporarily 
based in another Member State”. This implies a shift of the employed population towards another 
Member State of temporary employment. However, in fact there should not even be a job available 
in the Member State of origin. In that case an unemployed person could be recruited for posting and 
becomes a real stabilising mechanism. The temporary ‘export’ of unemployed persons will as a result 
lead to a lower public unemployment spending.27 There will also be an ‘artificial’ influence on 
employment rates in sending Member States in case there is a ‘temporary’ shift of employment to 
another Member State. 
 
Migration not necessarily guarantees employment in the new Member State of residence. Recent 
migrants aged 25 to 54 indeed show a higher unemployment rate compared to the nationals (Canetta 
et al., 2014; Fries-Tersch and Mabilia, 2015).28 Despite the so-called ‘welfare-magnet hypothesis’ 
(Borjas, 1999), which became a popular issue in public debate, in particular in the context of the EU 
enlargement, barriers appear to hamper the inclusion of migrants in the new Member State of 
residence (Giulietti and Kahanec, 2013). Despite the fact that the majority of migrants moves to find 
a job (IFK GHK and Milieu Ltd., 2014), these barriers to inclusion in the labour market could result 
in a shift of the elevated unemployment rate from the Member State of origin to the new Member 
State of residence. In case of posting, services should be requested by (sub)contractors/users of the 
temporary Member State of employment. This supposes a sufficiently high ‘foreign’ demand (which 
is not at all guaranteed) if posting of workers has to function as stabiliser. Moreover, also a sufficiently 
high ‘domestic’ supply is not guaranteed given that posting of workers is mainly employer-driven. 
This is in contrast to labour migration which is more a worker-driven decision.  Therefore, we tend 
to conclude that in particular private employment agencies will have to hire out a high number of 
workers since subcontracting and intra-group posting may have its limitations in number of workers 
being posted.29 In that case, there will be an employment relationship between the temporary 
 
27  For a detail discussion on the cost of unemployment see Gerard et al. (2012). 
28  When selecting the migrants of working age (15 to 64 years old) who live no longer than 10 years in their Member State of residence, 
the unemployment rate of this group will be lower compared to nationals. This might be the result of return migration by migrants who 
could not find a job. 
29  Art. 1(3) of Directive 96/71 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 1996 concerning the posting of workers in 
the framework of the provision of services covers three transnational posting situations. 
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employment agency and the worker during the period of posting and a business contract between 
the temporary employment agency and the user undertaking (Eurociett, 2009). 
 
Another limitation of migration is formulated in the conclusion of Kenen (1969, p. 11), stating that 
“we do not have perfect mobility because perfect interregional [labour] mobility implies perfect occupation mobility and 
the latter does not prevail”. One of the consequences is that migrant workers tend to be overqualified for 
the jobs they take up (OECD, 2012). This might even create a risk of displacement effects on low-
skilled jobs (European Commission, 2014d). On the contrary, posting is the result of a specific 
demand in the Member State of temporary employment which ensures labour mobility and 
occupation mobility. However, also in case of posting there might be a risk of displacement effects. 
Yet this risk is mainly concentrated to a limited number of Member States and within these Member 
States to labour-intensive sectors (De Wispelaere and Pacolet, 2015). 
 
The level of the migration cost, considered as one of the main factors influencing the probability of 
moving across geographic regions, will differ between migrant workers and posted workers. 
Transportation, housing and meals might be paid/compensated by the employer of the posted 
workers, in particular by a ‘per diem’ allowance (van Hoek and Houwerzijl, 2011). This implies in 
that case a much lower cost of moving compared to those faced by migrant workers.  
 
A potential negative consequence of migration is the risk of ‘brain drain’ in the Member State of 
origin (EC, 2014d). Eichengreen (2014) points out that this can have a permanent negative effect on 
the productivity and the competitiveness of the Member State of origin. To what extent this is a real 
threat was recently discussed by Cannetta et al. (2014). Based on the analysis of the mobility patterns 
of young citizens, they observe a slightly higher movement of highly educated people that, however, 
varies across Member States and is even the opposite for some Eastern European Member States. 
Interestingly, and perhaps even more important within the context of the so-called ‘brain drain’ 
debate, is that young people (15 to 34 years) show a much higher mobility pattern (Ibid., 2014; EC, 
2014). Nonetheless, this risk of ‘brain drain’ is only temporary in case of return migration and might 
even lead to increased skills, financial means and additional support of the Member State of origin 
(Kahanec, Zaiceva and Zimmerman, 2009; Zaiceva and Zimmerman, 2012). In the event of posting 
of workers brain drain is not a real threat or is also only temporary. Posting could even result in better 
skilled workers after the period of posting.  
 
Posting of workers as adjustment mechanism seems to have, however, an important disadvantage 
compared to labour migration when Member States are confronted with a persistent medium or long 
run asymmetric shock. Due to the maximum duration of posting determined by social security 
coordination law (max. 24 months) and taxation law (max. 183 days)30 posting of workers might be 
considered as a temporary adjustment mechanism.31 However, already after two months from the 
date of expiry of the previous posting period, a worker can be authorised to provide services in a 
Member State other than the Member State of origin (EC, 2012b). This should guarantee in the long 
run a sufficiently high permanent flow of posted workers. 
 
30  However, a longer period of posting than 183 days is possible. In that case posted workers will be taxed in their ‘temporary’ Member 
State of employment. 
31  However, see Art. 16 of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 (extendable to even 5 years if there is a common agreement between two or 
more Member States). 
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Figure 2 Impact posting of workers on OCA-criteria and other components 
 
Source Own figure 
Fulfilling also other OCA-criteria: fiscal transfers and wage flexibility 
Migration as adjustment mechanism might result in some important negative effects on the welfare 
of the Member State of origin (see, for instance, EC, 2014d). Among others, Farhi and Werning 
(2014) raised that “the interesting and less obvious question is whether this exodus [of migrants] also helps those that 
stay behind”. This is not necessarily the case if workers are posted to another Member State of 
employment. One could even argue that posting not only fulfils the labour mobility OCA-criteria but 
also other stabilising criteria.  
 
Permanent (labour) mobility involves that migrants will no longer be taxed in the Member State of 
origin. Together with their labour supply also their purchasing power is leaving, as stressed by Farhi 
and Werning (2014). As a result, Baglioni et al. (2014) conclude that this emigration also erodes the 
tax base and the number of people left to pay for the government debt which might constrain a 
dynamic national fiscal policy. This interplay between labour mobility and fiscal policy will also be 
influenced by the posting of workers. As mentioned before, posting is an exception from the general 
taxation principle as posted workers will be taxed in the Member State of origin for a certain period 
of time despite their temporary employment in another Member State. This has important 
consequences on the labour tax revenues of Member States hit by a negative shock. Labour will still 
be taxed by the Member State of origin which results in important labour tax revenues earned on the 
basis of the posting of workers. The latter is not the case if persons migrate to another Member State. 
It also guarantees the financing of the public debt and social protection expenses. Additionally, this 
involves that the posted worker can still claim social security benefits in case of unemployment, 
retirement, invalidity, etc. in the Member State of origin. The extent of these labour tax revenues 
through posting and their ability to act as a sufficient stabilisation tool in terms of ‘fiscal transfers’ 
will be estimated in the empirical part of this paper. However, issues to be tackled are the challenge 
of respecting minimum wages and the collection of the proper amount of social contributions and 
income taxes by the Member State of origin in case workers are posted. 
 
Another OCA-criterium acting as a stabilising mechanism is the realisation of wage flexibility. In case 
of a negative asymmetric shock a decrease of wages should lead to a lower level of unemployment by 
an increased demand of labour and a better competitive position of firms due to a lower labour cost 
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which should stimulate export. Wage flexibility will be realised only to a limited extent in case of 
posting. The ‘Posting of Workers Directive’32 limits to a high extent wage flexibility due to the 
application of a nucleus of terms and conditions of employment of the ‘host’ Member State.33 These 
provisions have according to Pelkmans (2006, p. 182) “not given precisely the workers from relatively poor 
EU countries a possibility to use their competitive advantage to the full (for short periods).” Still, posted workers 
might be willing to work for a minimum wage, which is sometimes (much) higher compared to the 
wage they would earn in the Member State of origin. From a different perspective, these minimum 
wages are lower compared to the average wage national workers of the receiving Member State are 
earning. Also, differences in social security and personal income tax rates between the Member State 
of origin and the Member State of temporary employment might lead to a lower labour cost and a 
competitive advantage for the ‘foreign’ service providers and their posted workers (De Wispelaere 
and Pacolet, 2015).  
 
Finally, the fact that a nucleus of terms and conditions of employment of the Member State of 
temporary employment has to be respected will most of the time lead to a (much) higher wage for 
the posted worker compared to the employment in the Member State of origin.34 Those higher wages 
will probably also lead to an increase of private consumption in the Member State of origin.  
Possible implementation problems due to the legal framework 
Some important limitations appear when taking the legal framework into regard. As mentioned 
before, in case of posting only for a maximum period of 24 months social security contributions will 
be paid in the Member State of origin as well for a maximum period of 183 days for personal income 
taxes. Moreover, certain legal conditions have to be fulfilled in order to be exempted from the 
payment of social security contributions and personal income taxes in the Member State of temporary 
employment. These rules might limit the potential added value of posting as stabilising mechanism. 
These conditions are defined in social security coordination and taxation law. First the possible 
limitations due to the coordination of social security schemes will be discussed.  
 
As mentioned before, labour migration could be considered as a rather individual decision. However, 
in case of posting there should be a direct relationship between the posted worker and an employer 
that ‘normally carries out its activities’ in the sending Member State (European Commission, 2012b). 
A number of principles emerge in order to determine if there is a ‘direct relationship’. Also, a series 
of indicators are to be verified in order to determine whether an employer carries out substantial 
activities (i.e. ‘normally carries out its activities’) in the Member State of origin (Ibid., p. 7).35, 36 These 
criteria are, however, not likely to affect posting as an adjustment mechanism.  
 
An important question is whether unemployed persons can be recruited for posting? The answer is 
positive (European Commission, 2012b) which is of course very important since this implicates that 
a major impact of posting as adjustment mechanism could be realised. The posted worker should, 
 
32  Directive 96/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 1996 concerning the posting of workers in the 
framework of the provision of services. 
33  Member States are not obliged to set or introduce minimum wages if they do not exist in the Member State in question. Therefore, 
also a debate on the introduction of a ‘EU minimum wage’ is ongoing. Italy, Austria, Denmark, Finland, Sweden and Cyprus are EU 
Member States where a minimum does not exist at this moment. For an overview of the monthly minimum wages see Eurostat 
[earn_mw_cur] 
34  Directive 96/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 1996 concerning the posting of workers in the 
framework of the provision of services. 
35  Art. 14 (2) of Regulation (EC) No 987/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 2009 laying down the 
procedure for implementing Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 on the coordination of social security systems. 
36  For instance, the distribution of the turnover achieved by the service provider in the Member State of origin and the Member State of 
temporary employment of the posted workers, etc.  
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however, be attached to the social security insurance of the Member State of origin before the start 
of the employment (for at least one month).37, 38  
 
Finally, the posted worker cannot be sent to replace another posted person.39 This means that in the 
long run a distribution of the posted workers over several (sub)contractors and Member States of 
temporary employment is necessary in order to guarantee a sufficient impact of posting as stabilising 
mechanism. 
 
Alongside the ‘183-days rule’, Art. 15 of the OECD Model Convention on Income and on Capital 
defines also some other limitations. If the posted worker is temporarily employed less than 183 days 
within a period of 12 months that starts or ends in the fiscal year concerned in another Member State 
than the Member State of origin, it has to be verified if the wage a) is paid by, or on behalf of, an 
employer who is not a resident of the other Member State, and b) the wage is not borne by a 
permanent establishment which the employer has in the other Member State. As stated by Spiegel et 
al. (2014, p. 25) “the question arises whether the sending employer or the receiving employer is to be considered the 
‘employer’ for the purposes of this article.”  The OECD (2010) has clarified the interpretation of ‘employer’ 
in its official commentary on the OECD Model Convention (see Commentary on article 15 
concerning the taxation of income from employment). However, Spiegel et al. (2014, p. 25) point out 
that “in this respect, it is worth mentioning that the term ‘employer’ has been subject to a lot of scholarly debate, 
diverging case law and dissenting opinions from finance authorities” (i.e. legal uncertainty). 
The potential stabilising effect of posting of workers for Greece 
The empirical evidence on the importance of the stabilising effect of labour mobility in the EMU (i.e. 
labour migration) is quite mixed. Some scholars tend to conclude that labour mobility is an 
insufficient adjustment mechanism (Puhani, 1999; Elsner and Zimmerman, 2013). Recent studies 
(Jauer et al., 2014; Arpaia et al., 2014) suggest, however, that labour mobility would absorb roughly 
25% (upper bounds) of the asymmetric shock after one year (see also Beyer and Smets, 2015).40, 41 
 
Posting of workers can have a stabilising effect. In this regard, an interesting question is how many 
workers would be unemployed if they were not posted. It is even thinkable that this is very limited 
today given that posting is probably not yet considered as a stabilising mechanism. Therefore, it is 
even more useful to calculate the potential (maximum?) stabilising effect of posting. The stabilising 
effect could be expressed in terms of number of posted workers in response to the increase of 
unemployment due to the asymmetric shock. The temporary ‘export of workers’ will also result in a 
decline of costs (in terms of public unemployment spending) and an increase of revenues (in terms 
of labour tax revenues, profit of the service providers, private consumption due to an increase of 
wages, etc.). However, a negative pressure on the receiving Member States and their social protection 
schemes might occur, as a possible result of job displacement or lower tax revenues following a 
negative pressure on wages. 
 
This paper will only estimate the labour taxes levied to the income of posted workers by the Member 
States of origin. The extent of the stabilisation effect of posting in terms of labour tax revenues will 
 
37  Art. 14 (1) of Regulation (EC) No 987/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 2009 laying down the 
procedure for implementing Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 on the coordination of social security systems. 
38  “A period of at least one month can be considered as meeting this requirement, with shorter periods requiring a case by case 
evaluation taking account of all the factors involved” (European Commission, 2012b, p. 10; Administrative Commission Decision A2). 
39  Art. 12 of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the coordination of social 
security systems. 
40  Based on the methodology used by Blanchard and Katz (1992). 
41  Jauer et al. (2014, p. 19) consider these estimates as upper bounds since “not all migration movements will be of unemployed people, 
and not all of those who move will take up employment elsewhere”. 
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be determined by different aspects: the number of posted workers, the wage earned in the Member 
State of temporary employment and finally the period of posting (and of course the social security 
and personal income tax rates of the Member State of origin). Based on these aspects different 
scenarios could be determined and calculated:  
- Number of posted workers: 1%, 5% or 10% of the unemployed persons are posted; 
- Member State of temporary employment: current breakdown, towards high-wage Member States; 
- Wage: 67% of the average wages or minimum wages; 
- Posting period: from 3 towards 6 or even 24 months. 
 
The definition we apply to calculate the annual labour tax revenues from the posted worker’s income 
received by the sending Member State = average gross monthly income Member State of 
temporary employment * social security contributions and personal income tax rates of the 
Member State of origin * number of PDs A1 issued * duration of the posting period.42 
 
The average gross monthly income of the posted worker is not known in the available administrative 
data or survey data.43 We have used, therefore, the earnings statistics of Eurostat in order to estimate 
the average monthly gross income (single person without children, 67% of the average wage).44 On 
these amounts the tax wedge (by type) (for a single person without children, 67% of the average 
wage) of the sending Member States is applied. In order to correct cross-border wages for the 
progressivity of the taxes, also the tax wedge levied on a lower (i.e. 50%) or a higher (i.e. 100%, 125% 
of 167%) percentage of the average wage by the sending Member should be taken into 
consideration.45 The average monthly labour tax revenues (by tax type) of the sending Member State 
have been multiplied by the numbers of Portable Documents A1 issued by the sending Member 
States. This will give us an idea of the monthly labour tax revenues received by the different sending 
Member States. This should also be multiplied by the average posting period in order to calculate the 
annual labour tax revenues. 
 
Based on our calculations, labour taxes levied to the income of the posted workers are equal to 
approximately 0.7% of the total monthly labour tax revenues of the sending Member States (De 
Wispelaere and Pacolet, 2015). The real annual impact will, however, be lower since the average 
posting period is not equal to 12 months. This current marginal impact of posting on total labour tax 
revenues limits the ability to act as a sufficient stabilisation tool. However, as mentioned before, it is 
probably even more useful to calculate the potential (i.e. maximum?) stabilising effect of posting. 
 
Different scenarios will be applied to Greece given that posting of workers could be considered as a 
potential adjustment mechanism for the current dire economic and financial situation in this EMU 
Member State. In April 2014, the EC (2014a) published a fourth review of an assessment of the 
progress made by Greece with respect to its Second Economic Adjustment Programme. No attention 
was paid in this report to the impact of labour mobility as potential adjustment mechanism. Also the 
most recent third bailout programme did not include stabilising measures through labour mobility.46 
 
42  For a more detailed description of the methodology see De Wispelaere and Pacolet, 2015. 
43 A nucleus of terms and conditions of employment of the Member State of temporary employment has to be respected, defined by 
Directive 96/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 1996 concerning the posting of workers in the 
framework of the provision of services. However, the labour conditions of the Member State of origin remain applicable if these are 
more favourable to workers. 
44  No breakdown by sector of activity could be made which is of course an important methodological limitation. 
45  Some caution is required when applying tax wedges in order to determine the labour tax revenues from cross-border incomes since 
most Member States levy progressive tax rates on earnings through the application of income-based tax brackets. Since average 
wages are not similar across Member States, average cross-border wages might be taxed differently compared to the average 
national wages (i.e. 67% of the average wage in the Member State of origin is not necessarily similar to this of the Member State of 
employment). 
46  http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-15-5513_en.htm 
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Greece shows a current unemployment rate of 26%, equal to approximately 1.3 million unemployed 
persons (EC, 2015a). Despite the decrease by 1.3 p.p. compared to a year earlier Greece still has the 
highest unemployment rate in the EU-28. The youth unemployment rate is even more problematic 
as 51% of the persons aged 15-24 is unemployed. The forecasts for 2015 and 2016 assume a decline 
of the unemployment rate to 25.6% in 2015 and 23.2% in 2016 as a result of growth and the 
employment programmes (EC, 2015b). Those figures prove the necessity of a stabilisation tool, 
among others by the export of these unemployed persons through the posting rules. Consequently, 
Greece shows an annual emigration rate (as a percentage of the total population) of approximately 
1% between 2011 and 2013 (Fries-Tersch and Mabilia, 2015).   
 
Greece received some € 65.3 billion tax revenues in 2012 equal to 33.7% of GDP (EC, 2014c). Some 
€ 24.3 billion or 37% of the tax revenues could be related to employed labour (personal income taxes 
and social security contributions) of which € 9.3 billion paid by employers and € 15.1 paid by 
employees (Ibid.). € 18.1 billion social contributions were received of which € 9.3 million paid by 
employers and € 8.8 million paid by employees. These figures are a point of reference for the 
assessment of the stabilising capacity of posting in terms of ‘fiscal’ transfers. 
In 2013, Greece has issued only 1,688 PDs A1 related to posting of workers of which 1,068 PDs A1 
issued for the posting of workers to Germany (Pacolet and De Wispelaere, 2014). Despite this low 
number of forms issued, this implies an increase by 163% compared to 2010 which is the highest 
increase of all EU-28/EFTA countries. Nonetheless, this is only equal to 0.05% of the employed 
population in Greece. The limited number of PDs A1 issued implies also a negligible amount of 
labour taxes levied to the wages of the outgoing posted workers and a marginal impact on total labour 
tax revenues. 
However, if a significant number of (unemployed) persons living in Greece would be posted to 
another Member State during a period of at least 6 months, much more taxes would be levied by 
Greece. If Greece could accomplish that 10% of the unemployed persons, equal to some 127,300 
persons or 3.5% of the employed population, are temporarily posted to another Member State for 6 
months, yearly some € 776 million taxes could be collected, which is equal to 3.2% of their total 
labour tax revenues (Table 2). This amount will even be higher if these workers are posted for the 
complete year (€ 1.4 billion or 5.9% of total labour tax revenues). Those figures prove that posting 
can act as a potential stabilisation tool.47  
 
47  Slovenia is probably a good example since a high number of their employed population is posted. However, more detailed 
information on the context is required to draw any definite conclusions. 
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Table 2 Estimated labour tax revenues from posting of workers (in million €) and impact on total labour 
tax revenues, different scenarios, Greece, 2013 
 Employers’ 
social 
contributions 
(in million €) 
 (1 month) 
Employees’ 
social 
contributions  
(in million €) 
(1 month) 
Personal 
Income  
(in million €)) 
(1 month) 
Total  
(in million €) 
(1 month) 
Period of 6 
months 
(in million €) 
% of 
total 
labour 
tax 
revenues 
Period of 
12 months  
(excl. Personal 
Income taxes)* 
(in million €) 
% of 
total 
labour 
tax 
revenues 
Current situation 1 1 0 2 9 0.0% 17 0.1% 
1% of unemployed 
persons (12,730) 
8 5 1 13 78 0.3% 144 0.6% 
Towards high 
wage MSs 
9 5 1 15 88 0.4% 165 0.7% 
5% of unemployed 
persons 
38 23 4 65 388 1.6% 722 3.0% 
10% of 
unemployed 
persons 
75 45 9 129 776 3.2% 1,445 5.9% 
* Total labour tax revenues: figures of 2012 
** After 183-days personal income taxes will be paid in the Member State of temporary employment. 
Source Own calculations based on Pacolet and De Wispelaere, 2014 and Eurostat 
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Conclusion 
Several reasons favour ‘temporary’ intra-EU labour mobility through posting of workers rather than 
a more ‘permanent’ intra-EU labour mobility through migration of EU-workers and self-employed 
persons, as a prerequisite for an optimum currency area or as a stabilisation tool to support 
adjustment to asymmetric shocks. Moreover, other criteria to realise an optimum currency area and 
to stabilise asymmetric shocks, in particular through fiscal transfers and wage flexibility, could be 
fulfilled by the posting of workers as well. The ability of posting - which involves workers being 
temporarily employed in a Member State other than their Member State of origin but still being taxed 
in their Member State of origin - to increase employment, to decrease unemployment, to increase 
household incomes and labour tax revenues in the Member State of origin are important features. 
This posting mechanism is therefore a useful stabilisation tool if the Member State of origin is 
confronted with an asymmetric shock. It might even be considered as an ‘economic panacea’48. 
However, there are also some important limitations. Firstly, a sufficiently high ‘foreign’ demand for 
services and a ‘domestic’ supply of workers is required. Secondly, due to the maximum posting period 
determined by social security coordination law (max. 24 months) and taxation law (max. 183 days) 
posting of workers might be considered as a temporary adjustment mechanism. Finally, the challenge 
of respecting minimum wages and the collection of the proper amount of social contributions and 
income taxes by the Member State of origin in case workers are posted, are outstanding issues to be 
tackled. The impact of the stabilisation effect of posting will be determined by several aspects: the 
number of posted workers, the wage earned in the Member State of temporary employment and 
finally the period of posting. This stabilisation effect was calculated for Greece. If some 10% of the 
current unemployed population living in Greece would be posted for a period of 6 months or longer, 
yearly approximately € 1 billion labour tax revenues would be collected by Greece, which is equal to 
roughly 4% of their total labour tax revenues. We recommend on this basis that Greece could 
encourage the use of posting of workers as potential stabilisation tool. However, more research is 
required to assess in detail the social and economic impact of posting as stabilising mechanism on 
sending and receiving Member States.
 
48 Refering to the book of Prof. Yves Jorens (2009), Handboek Europese detachering en vrij verkeer van diensten. Economisch 
wondermiddel of sociaal kerkhof? 
  
19 
References 
Abraham, F. (1996), ‘Economic federalism and European Union’, in Pacolet, J. (ed.), Social Protection 
and the European Economic and Monetary Union, Avebury, Aldershot, p. 89 – 108. 
Allard, C., Koeva Brooks, P., Bluedorn, J.C., Bornhorst, K., Ohnsorge, F. and Poghosyan, T, ‘Toward 
a Fiscal Union for the Euro Area’, IMF Staff Discussion Note, No. 9, 29 p. 
Arestis, P. and Sawyer, M. (2011), ‘The Design Faults of the Economic and Monetary Union’, Journal 
of Contemporary European Studies, Vol. 19, No. 1, p. 21-32. 
Arpaia, A., Kiss, A., Palvolgui, B. and Turrini, A. (2014), ‘Labour mobility and labour market 
adjustment in the EU’, Economic Papers, No. 539, EC-DG Economic and Financial Affairs, 37 p. 
Baglioni, A. Boitani, A. and Bordignon, M. (2013), ‘Is labor mobility a prerequisite for an optimal 
currency area? Labor mobility and fiscal policy in a currency union’, La finanza pubblica nei sistemi 
multilivello: coordinamento, concorrenza e disciplina fiscal, xxv conference, Pavia, 48 p. 
Beblavy, M., Marconi, G. and Maselli, I. (2015), ‘A European Unemployment Benefit Scheme. The 
rationale and the challenges ahead’, Working Paper, CEPS, commissioned by DG EMPL, 28 p. 
Bernaciak, M. (2014), ‘Social dumping and the EU integration process’, Working Paper, No. 6, ETUI, 
26 p. 
Beyer, R. C. M. and Smets, F. (2015), ‘Labour market adjustments in Europe and the US: How 
different?’, ECB Working Paper Series, No. 1767, 32 p. 
Blanchard, O., J. and Katz, L. F. (1992), ‘Regional Evolutions’, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1, 
74 p. 
Bonin, H., Eichhorst, W., Florman, C., Okkels Hansen, M., Skiöld, L., Stuhler, J., Tatsiramos, K, 
Thomasen, H. and Zimmerman, K., F. (2008), Geographic Mobility in the European Union: Optimising 
its Economic and Social Benefits, IZA Research Report, No. 19. 
Bordo, M. D., Jonung, L. and Markiewicz, A. (2013), ‘A Fiscal Union for the Euro: Some Lessons 
from History’, CESifo Economic Studies, 40 p. 
Borjas, G.J. (1999), ‘Immigration and Welfare Magnets’, Journal of Labor Economics, Vol. 17, No. 4, p. 
607-637. 
Canetta, E., Fries-Tersch, E. and Mabilia, V. (2014), Annual report on statistics on intra-EU movers, 
Network Statistics FMSSFE, European Commission, September 2014, 76 p. 
Canoy, M., Horvath, A., Hubert, A. (2010), ‘Post-Enlargement Migration and Public Perception in 
the European Union’, in Kahanec, M and Zimmerman, K.F. (Eds.), EU Labor Markets After Post-
Enlargement Migration, Springer, p. 47-70. 
Claeys, G., Darvas, Z. and Wolff, G., B. (2014), ‘Benefits and drawbacks of European unemployment 
insurance’, Bruegelpolicybrief, September 2014. 
Clemens, F. and Peichl, A. (2012), ‘European Fiscal Union: What Is It? Does It Work? And Are 
There Really ‘No Alternatives’?, IZA Policy Paper, No. 39. 
Darvas, Z. (2010), ‘Fiscal Federalism in Crisis: Lessons for Europe from the US’, Working Paper 
2010/2, Corvinus University of Budapest, Department of Mathematical Economics and 
Economic Analysis’, 19 p. 
De Grauwe, P. (2014), ‘Macroeconomic Policies in the Eurozone since the Sovereign Debt Crisis’, 
KU Leuven, Euroforum. 
  
20 
De Grauwe, P. (2012), Economics of Monetary Union, Ninth edition, Oxford University Press, 269 p. 
De Grauwe, P. and Mongelli, F.P. (2005), ‘Endogeneities of optimum currency areas. What brings 
countries sharing a single currency closer together’, ECB Working Paper Series, No. 468, 38 p. 
De Wispelaere, F. and Pacolet, J. (2015), ‘Posting of workers: the impact of social security 
coordination and income taxation law on welfare states’, HIVA Working Paper, HIVA – 
KU Leuven, Leuven. 
Dullien, S. (2014), A European Unemployment Benefits Scheme. How to Provide for More Stability in the Euro 
Zone, Bertelsmann Stiftung, 143 p. 
Eichengreen, B. (2014), ‘The Eurozone crisis: the theory of optimum currency areas bites back’, 
Notenstein Academy White Paper Series, 18 p. 
Eichengreen, B. (1991), ‘Is Europe an optimum currency area’, NBER Working Paper Series, No. 3579, 
78 p. 
Elsner, B. and Zimmerman, K.F. (2013), ’10 Years After EU Enlargement, Closed Borders, and 
Migration to Germany’, IZA Discussion Paper, No. 7130. 
Eurociett (2009), Setting up a European Observatory on cross-border activities within temporary agency work, 
Eurociett, Brussels, 34 p. 
European Central Bank (2006), ‘Cross-border labour mobility within an enlarged EU’, Occasional Paper 
Series, No. 52. 
European Commission (2015a), EU Employment and Social Situation. Quarterly Review, DG EMPL, 
Brussels, 55 p. 
European Commission (2015b), European Economic Forecast. Spring 2015, Directorate-General for 
Economic and Financial Affairs, Brussels, 200 p. 
European Commission (2014a), ‘The Second Economic Adjustment Programme for Greece. Fourth 
Review’, Occasional Papers 192, Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs, Brussels. 
European Commission (2014b), Recent trends in the geographical mobility of workers in the EU, EU 
Employment and Social Situation – Quarterly Review – Supplement June 2014, DG EMPL. 
European Commission (2014c), Taxation trends in the European Union, Eurostat. 
European Commission (2014d), Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2014, DG-EMPL. 
European Commission (2013a), ‘Strengthening the social dimension of the economic and monetary 
union’, COM (2013)690, Brussels. 
European Commission (2013b), Paper on automatic stabilisers, DG EMPL, 54 p. 
European Commission (2013c), ‘Chapter 5. Convergence and divergence in EMU – employment and 
social aspects’, in European Commission – DG EMPL, Employment and Social Developments in Europe, 
p. 279-319. 
European Commission (2012a), ‘A blueprint for a deep and genuine economic and monetary union. 
Launching a European Debate’, COM (2012)777final/2, Brussels. 
European Commission (2012b), Practical guide. The legislation that applies to workers in the European Union 
(EU), the European Economic Area (EEA) and in Switzerland, Brussels, 40 p. 
European Commission of the European Communities (1990), One Market, One Money: An Evaluation 
of the Potential Benefits and Cost of Forming an Economic and Monetary Union, 347 p. 
European Council (2012), ‘Towards a genuine economic and monetary union’, European Council. 
Farhi, E. and Werning, I. (2014), ‘Labor Mobility within Currency Unions’, NBER Working Paper, No. 
20105, 26 p. 
Frankel, J.A. and Rose, A.K. (1996), ‘The Endogeneity of the Optimum Currency Area Criteria’, 
NBER Working Paper Series, No. 5700, 33 p. 
  
21 
Feld, L.P. and Osterloh, S. (2013), ‘Is a fiscal capacity really necessary to complete EMU?’, Paper 
presented at workshop “How to build a genuine economic and monetary Union”. 
Fries-Tersch, E. and Mabilia, V. (2015), Annual report on statistics on intra-EU movers, Network Statistics 
FMSSFE, European Commission, to be published. 
Gerard, M., Valsamis, D. and Van der Beken, W. (2012), Why invest in employment? A study on the cost of 
unemployment, Idea Consult, on behalf of European Federation for Services to Individuals, Brussels, 
115 p. 
Giulietti, C. and Kahanec, M. (2013), ‘Does generous welfare attract immigrants? Towards evidence-
Based Policy-Making’, in Guild, E., Carrera, S. and Eisele, K. (Eds.), Social benefits and migration. A 
contested relationship and policy challenge in the EU, Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), 
Brussels, p. 111-127. 
Green, A.E, Baldauf, B. and Owen, D. (2009), Short-term mobility. Final report, Warwick Institute, 
VC/2008/0007. 
Horvath, J. (2003), ‘Optimum currency area theory: A selective review’, BOFIT Discussion Papers, No. 
15, 37 p. 
Iara, A. (2015), ‘Revenue for EMU: A contribution to the debate on Fiscal Union’, Taxation Papers, 
No. 54, EC – DG Taxation and Customs Union, 24 p. 
ICF GHK and Milieu Ltd. (2014), A fact finding analysis on the impact on the Member States’ social security 
systems of the entitlements of non-active intra-EU migrant to special non-contributory cash benefits and healthcare 
granted on the basis of residence, on behalf of DG EMPL via DG Justice Framework Contract, 275 p. 
Idea Consult and Ecorys (2011), Study on the economic and social effects associated with the phenomenon of posting 
of workers in the EU, on behalf of the European Commission – DG EMPL, 180 p. 
Ismeri (2012), Preparatory study for an Impact Assessment concerning the possible revision of the legislative 
framework on the posting of workers in the context of the provision of services, on behalf of the European 
Commission – DG EMPL. 
Jager, J. and Hafner, K.A. (2013), ‘The Optimum Currency Area and the EMU. An Assessment in 
the Context of the Eurozone Crisis’, Intereconomics 2013, p. 315. 
Jauer, J., Liebig T., Martin, J. and Puhani, P. (2014), ‘Migration as an Adjustment Mechanism in the 
crisis? A comparison of Europe and the United States’, IZA Discussion Paper, No. 7921. 
Jorens, Y. (ed.), Handboek Europese detachering en vrij verkeer van diensten. Economisch wondermiddel of sociaal 
kerkhof?, p. 317-341. 
Juncker, J., Tusk, D., Dijsselbloem, J., Draghi, M. and Schulz, M. (2015), Completing Europe’s Economic 
and Monetary Union, European Commission, 23 p. 
Kahanec, M. (2012), ‘Labor Mobility in an Enlarged European Union’, IZA Discussion Paper, No. 
6485. 
Kahanec, M., Zaiceva, A. and Zimmerman, K.F. (2010), ‘Lessons from Migration after EU 
Enlargement’ in Kahanec, M and Zimmerman, K.F. (Eds.), EU Labor Markets After Post-Enlargement 
Migration, Springer, p. 3-46. 
Kenen, P. (1969), ‘The Theory of Optimum Currency Areas: An Eclectic View’, in Mundell, R. and 
Swoboda (eds.), Monetary Problems in the International Economy, University of Chicago Press. 
Krugman, P. (2012), ‘Revenge of the Optimum Currency Area’, In D. Acemoglu, J. Parker and 
M. Woodford (eds.), NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2012, Vol. 27, University of Chicago Press, 
Chicago. 
Maslauskaité, K. (2014), ‘Posted workers in the EU: State of play and regulatory evolution’, Policy 
Paper, No. 107, Notre Europe – Jacques Delors Institute 20 p. 
  
22 
Minderhoud, P. (2009), ‘New patterns of migration and challenges’, in Jorens, Y. (ed.), 50 years of Social 
Security Coordination. Past – Present – Future, European Commission, p. 150-167. 
McKinnon, R. (1963), ‘Optimum Currency Areas’, American Economic Review, Vol. 52, p. 717-725. 
Mongelli, F., P. (2008), ‘European economic and monetary integration and the optimum currency 
area theory’, Economic Papers, No. 302 
Mundell, R., A. (1961), ‘A Theory of Optimum Currency Areas’, The American Economic Review, Vol. 
51, No. 4, p. 657-665. 
Oates, W.E. (2005), ‘Toward A Second-Generation Theory of Fiscal Federalism’, International Tax and 
Public Finance, Vol. 12, p. 349-373 
Oates, W.E. (1999), ‘An Essay on Fiscal Federalism’, Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 37, No. 3, p. 
1120-1149. 
Oates, W.E (1972), Fiscal Federalism, Hartcourt Brace Jovanovich, New York. 
OECD (2010), Commentaries on the articles of the Model Tax Convention, 423 p. 
OECD (2012), OECD Economic Surveys: European Union 2012, OECD Publishing. 
Pacolet J. and De Wispelaere, F. (2015), ‘The State of  the Welfare State in Europe Anno 1992 and 
20 years later – Figures and trends’, presented at European conference ‘The State of the Welfare State 
in Europe Anno 1992 and 20 Years later’, Leuven, 19-20 October 2015. 
Pacolet, J. and De Wispelaere, F. (2014), ‘Posting of workers: Report on A1 portable documents 
issued in 2012 and 2013’, Network Statistics FMSSFE, European Commission, 40 p. 
Pelkmans, J. (2006), European Integration. Methods and Economic Analysis. Third Edition, Pearson 
Education Limited, 480 p. 
Prammer, D. (2011), ‘Quality of taxation and the crisis: tax shifts from a growth perspective’, Taxation 
Papers, No. 29, EC – DG Taxation and Customs Union, 60 p. 
Puhani, P.A. (1999), ‘Labour Mobility – An Adjustment Mechanism in Euroland? Empirical Evidence 
for Western Germany, France, and Italy’, ZEW Discussion Papers, No. 99-47, 30 p. 
Spiegel, B. (ed), Daxkobler, K., Strban, G. and van der Mei, A.P. (2014), Analytical report 2014: The 
relationship between social security coordination and taxation law, FreSsco, European Commission, 60 p. 
Vandenbroucke, F. (2014), ‘The case for a European Social Union. From muddling through a sense 
of common purpose’, KU Leuven - Euroforum, 28 p. 
Vandenbroucke, F. and Vanhercke B. (2014), A European Social Union: 10 tough nuts to crack, Friends 
of Europe, 158 p. 
van Hoek, A. and  Houwerzijl, M. (2011) ‘Complementary study on the legal aspects of the posting 
of workers in the framework of the provision of services in the European Union’, University of 
Amsterdam, EC - Contract VC/2011/0096, 423 p. 
Van Overmeiren, F. (2008), Buitenlandse arbeidskrachten op de Belgische arbeidsmarkt. Sociaal recht en vrij 
verkeer, Larcier, Gent, 321 p. 
Yoshimi, T. (2014), ‘Currency Integration under Labor Mobility: when Cost is incurred’, Journal of 
Economic Integration, Vol. 29, No. 1, p. 188-209. 
Zaiceva, A. and Zimmerman, K.F. (2008), ‘Scale, Diversity, and Determinants of Labour Migration 
in Europe’, IZA Discussion Paper Series, No. 3595, 37 p. 
Zaiceva, A. and Zimmerman, K.F. (2012), ‘Returning Home at Times of Trouble? Return Migration 
of EU Enlargement Migrants during the Crisis’, IZA Discussion Paper Series, No. 7111, 25 p. 
Zimmerman, K.F. (2009), ‘Labor Mobility and the Integration of European Labor Markets’, DIW 
Berlin Discussion Papers, No. 862, 32 p. 
 
